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Cavell After Cavell: A Philosophy Without Tears 
EDITORIAL COMMENT 
The world is full of complainers. But the fact is, nothing comes 
with a guarantee. 
JOEL AND ETHAN COEN, Blood Simple 
1. After June 19th, the title—“Cavell after Cavell”—for this collection of papers on 
Stanley Cavell’s rich philosophical work has taken on a new meaning. Originally, con-
tributors were asked to explore new trends based on Cavell's thought, but what we 
have now is also reminiscent of an homage by some notable scholars who were his 
students or who knew him very well. 
In the first paper, Victor J. Krebs traces two of the main topics that thread 
Stanley Cavell’s otherwise eclectic and idiosyncratic themes: his reinterpretation of 
skepticism and the role played by the philosophy of ordinary language “in the midst 
of the temptation of skepticism.” 
Next, Alice Crary takes up yet another thread that runs through Cavell's explo-
rations of numerous themes. It is, to be sure, a thread that has received less attention 
than the aforementioned two, namely, “a preoccupation with what it is to be a res-
ponsible participant in a democratic polis”. 
Third, Nancy Bauer contributes with her own perspective on the difficulty of 
getting to feel confident about one’s own tastes, especially after having studied and 
worked with an author like Cavell who had an iron trust in his own tastes, despite 
being, or perhaps because they are so, idiosyncratic. And she does this by telling us 
how she came to read Beauvoir’s Le Deuxième Sexe  “in the rather unusual way that 1
[she] do[es].” 
In the fourth paper of this collection, Gordon Bearn carries out two interesting 
and commendable tasks: the first is to try to understand what Cavell means exactly 
! . Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 1997).1
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when he says that the writings of Thoreau and Emerson underwrite the procedures of 
ordinary language philosophy characteristic of the work of Austin and Wittgenstein. 
Secondly, he wants to suggest that this underwriting could be further secured by in-
cluding what Whitman calls “the merge” and “the outlet,” i.e., a type of mysticism 
that redeems ordinary words through an abundance of experience. 
The collection ends with yet another exploration of the consequences of Ca-
vell’s continuation of Ordinary Language Philosophy. In her paper, Sandra Laugier 
makes good on her well known insistence that “ordinary language philosophy is from 
the outset oriented toward social matters” by exploring the connections between Or-
dinary Language Philosophy and the ethics of care. Thus, her “goal is to use [Cavell’s] 
work to interpret ordinary language philosophy in such a way that it can serve as a 
basis for re-defining ethics as attention to ordinary life and as care for moral expres-
sion.” 
For my part, in what follows I would like to make my own modest and very 
brief contribution, both to the homage and to what lies ahead after Cavell. 
2. Some years ago I was commissioned to translate into Spanish Cavell’s Contesting 
Tears.  The most difficult decision I had to make, in a task that itself was full of difficult 2
decisions, came down to the following: how to translate the word “contesting” without 
missing any of Cavell’s intended meaning. In Spanish and in the context of the movies 
discussed by Cavell, "contesting" can mean many things: from tears that are "challen-
ging", to tears that are shed as a complaint, or as an alternative to an ominous situation 
that requires rebutting, etc.  I considered several options, but I was not satisfied with 
any of them. Professor Cavell was kind enough to discuss with me each of the many al-
ternative and suitable translations I proposed to him one after another in my increasin-
gly desperate e-mails. Finally, we went for a not so literal translation. And that's how 
we came to the final title of the Spanish translation: “Más Allá de las Lágrimas,” literally 
“Beyond Tears.” Not only is it not a literal translation of the original English title, but it 
implies a no less important difference: the Spanish title stops qualifying the object, i.e., 
the tears that the unknown women shed at some point, and goes on to tell us something 
! . Cavell, Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. Chicago: The Uni2 -
versity of Chicago Press, 1996).
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about these women. And what it says is that they have all gone through a moment of 
revelation, or as Cavell puts it, they have at last formulated their own cogito, i.e., they 
exist because from that moment on they will speak by themselves. These women, unlike 
their sisters from the comedies of remarriage, don’t need to be educated, but rather to 
accept who they are, what they think. In other words, they vindicate their right to have 
a voice in their own lives. In this sense, they clearly perceive that the world in which 
they had lived until that very moment has nothing to offer them; therefore, when they 
decide to leave that world behind, they are leaving nothing worth crying for. They have 
reached a level of “spiritual existence” far higher than those who used to be part of their 
(not so) ordinary world. In this situation, the tears caused by the different sacrifices 
that these unknown women are forced to make, are due not so much to the fact that 
they are resigned to the sad and ominous needs that they have been forced to accept, 
but to the sadness and even shame that they start feeling as soon as they realize that 
until that very moment they never had a voice in their own story. At last, then, they 
claim for themselves the right to judge the world that has forced them to sacrifice 
themselves in this way. The transformation that they experience from that moment re-
quires, paraphrasing Cavell, that they break with what they had previously accepted as 
necessary and seek other needs that are more necessary. Be that as it may, these wo-
men are clearly beyond tears. 
3. In his unmistakable style, Bertrand Russell begins his “Logic and Ontology,” origi-
nally published in 1957, with the following remark: “My purpose in this article is first 
to discuss G. F. Warnock’s ‘Metaphysics in Logic’ […] Mr. Warnock belongs to the 
‘Philosophy-Without-Tears’ School, so named because it makes philosophy very 
much easier than it has ever been before: in order to be a competent philosopher, it is 
only necessary to study Fowler’s Modern English Usage; post-graduates may advan-
ce to The King’s English, but this book is to be used with caution for, as its title 
shows, it is somewhat archaic.”  3
The good connoisseur would have inmediately realized that when Russell says 
“Philosophy-Without-Tears” he is actually referring to Ordinary Language Philo-
. Bertrand Russell, “Logic and Ontology,” The Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 9 (1957): 225.3
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sophy at large, and to (the later) Wittgenstein in particular, a philosopher that Russell 
was convinced had thrown his talent overboard and, in doing so, had philosophically 
degraded himself to common sense. 
In my opinion, Russell’s remark hinges on two stereotypes underwritten by, 
say, the Philosophy-with-Tears school. On the one hand, philosophy’s traditional se-
arch, say, for purity, is an epic quest that demands effort and involves suffering and, 
therefore, can cause tears. On the other hand, it is considered common sensical, lea-
ving everything as it is, and therefore takes neither the traditional problems of philo-
sophy seriously enough, nor does it say anything epic but, rather, it makes philosophy 
too easy. In both cases, the Philosophy-with-Tears school acknowledges our tragic 
condition—that “nothing comes with a guarantee”—but doesn’t accept it. 
Russell is definitely right when he suggests that Wittgenstein belongs to the 
“Philosophy-Without-Tears” school, but he is completely wrong in thinking that 
Wittgenstein makes philosophy all too easy. I think it is rather the opposite. Accor-
ding to Wittgenstein, (1)  “the crystalline purity of logic, was, of course, not a result of 
the investigation; it was a requirement”;  because (2) Wittgenstein is concerned 4
“about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, and not about some non-
spatial, non-temporal phantasm”;  and (3) the requirement is “in danger of becoming 5
empty,”  that is to say, Russell’s philosophy is not epic after all, but rather its cons6 -
tant quest for purity hides or is an answer to its unwillingness to accept the tragic na-
ture of our real condition; therefore (4) “[t]he preconceived idea of crystalline purity 
can only be removed by turning our whole examination round.”  In a nutshell, Witt7 -
genstein’s is a philosophy-without-tears not because it is easy, but rather because it 
does not miss anything—i.e., guarantees, justifications, epistemic certainty…—we, 
philosophers, should be looking for; instead it seems to destroy anything that philo-
sophers of the Philosophy-with-Tears—i.e., Russell’s—School have deemed important 
(Ibid., §118). In this sense, then, Wittgenstein’s is, no doubt about that, a philosophy-
without-tears because it is beyond tears. 
! . Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, rev. 4th edn., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. 4
Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §107.
! . Ibid., §108.5
! . Ibid.6
! . Ibid., §107.7
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 As a would-be member of Wittgenstein’s School of Philosophy-Without-Te-
ars, if that school had existed, Cavell’s too is a philosophy beyond tears.  8
DAVID PÉREZ-CHICO  
! . This is a question in which I have been working intermittently over the last few years and which I 8
won’t explore in further detail here. See Pérez Chico, “Filosofía sin lágrimas”, in Stanley Cavell, mun-
dos vistos y ciudades de palabras, ed. A. Lastra (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 2010), 57-85; Pérez 
Chico, “Filosofía más allá de las lágrimas: Stanley Cavell a partir de los melodramas de la mujer desco-
nocida”, in Cine y Filosofía, Athenaica, ed. H. Muñoz, forthcoming. Furthermore, it is the main topic 
of a book in preparation on Cavell and Wittgenstein that is intended to be a vindication of the impor-
tance of Ordinary Language Philosophy.
